An integral part of Smith's theory is quite obviously the ability to sympathize. Though, as Cristina and Sebastian have pointed out, he does not quite distinguish sympathy and empathy in a way that would be more convincing, his account does seem to align with many patterns that we see in daily interactions as well as wider social interactions. An important distinction that he does make is that, "sympathy... does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation that excites it" (12). Perhaps an easy way of characterizing sympathy is to feel sorry, or happy or whatever affection, that an individual is in the situation that they are in, rather than feeling those affections for the person. This is because we can more easily imagine ourselves in the situation than as the person due to our lack of complete knowledge of others. The significance of this distinction is made more clear in Section I, Chapter III when Smith says, "When we judge in this manner of any affection, as proportioned or disproportioned to the cause which excites it, it is scarce possible that we should make use of any other rule or canon but the correspondent affection in ourselves" (18). Furthermore, "if, upon bringing the case home to our own breast, we find that the sentiments which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with our own, we necessarily approve of them as proportioned and suitable to their objects; if otherwise, we necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion" (19).
So, we feel sympathy for the situation that a person is in rather than the person directly. Additionally, we can only feel this sympathy if we think that the reaction the person has is proportioned or suitable to the object/stimulant of the situation. Lastly, and most importantly, we can only find the reaction suitable or proportioned if we think that we would have a similar reaction to that object/stimulant. If this is true and accepted, it would make clear the problem of privilege. As sociologist Michael Kimmel puts it, 'privilege is invisible to those who have it.' This was also supported in Lebron's writings. Even with the utmost reflection, it is extremely difficult to separate oneself from the realities of one's life-- and that includes one's privilege. Take, for example, a female college student who walks around campus with pepper spray; she feels extreme fear as a reaction to being alone at night. Male college students may evaluate her reaction to that situation as excessive. 'She has no reason to be so afraid,' they might say, 'this is a college campus, it's safe.' Because of their privilege inherent to being a male, there is little to no way that they can understand the fear the female student feels, and thus they believe it unjustifiable. They do not feel the degree of sympathy that the female student would say is justified. Even the most intensive efforts to understand the student's fear cannot truly be successful, because for that they would have to experience it themselves.
Smith's theory makes it clear why we tend to invalidate other's experiences or reactions and partake in activities like tone-policing, but it also leads us to question of what would be the most virtuous behavior. Do we accept the female student's account that her fear is justifiable (or any group that is discriminated against on a wider scale), or do we value what a third-party observer would say is justifiable? Smith seems to suggest that a balance between these two is the most virtuous. I'm not completely convinced on this point yet, at least insofar as using this as a widely applicable rule of thumb.
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