Of Mice and Morality

One of the things I find most interesting about Posner is his attempts to rationalize his principles. You mention that you feel uncomfortable with Posner’s dismissal of the intrinsic value of humans, and from his writing, it appears that he is as well. He spends a significant portion of his writing attempting to explain how welfare maximization fit with our moral intuitions and is not conducive to moral monstrousness. Even though Posner argues for a form of morality and justice based on welfare maximization, he bends over backwards to make it seem more palatable. Posner attempts to justify welfare maximization by showing that economic liberty will be upheld in his scheme, and that he gives weight to both utility and consent. Economic liberty will be ensured because all economists believe in the wealth maximization of free markets, it’s obviously the best solution. This sort of protection of liberty, however, is superficial at best and nonexistent at worst. If there were some sort of market failure, the most efficient solution for which would be to suspend liberty, no doubt it would be suspended indefinitely. He also explains how segregation, genocide, and slavery would be “far-fetched” and that it would be “unlikely” that it would increase society’s wealth. Posner also claims that welfare maximization would involve “greater respect for individual choice”, and that it has a firmer foundation for a theory of justice. He mentions that it provides a basis for laws, and that they must, among other things, treat people equally. However, he also does not believe that a person without the means to support himself should have a say in the distribution of resources. This is because, as Posner puts it, “to treat the inventor and the idiot equally concerning their moral claim… does not take seriously the differences between persons.” It seems that this completely undermines Posner’s claim that he allows for individual choice and for consistency with intuitive morality.

Posner’s justification for welfare maximization based on being consistent with pareto efficiency and consent is nonsensical. He attempts to use this a basis for his welfare maximization while also claiming that morality is based whether morals maximize welfare. Posner plays a game of circular logic, begging the question of basic rights when he tries to maximize welfare and vice versa. There is no independent justification for his welfare maximization, and he rests on no more solid ground than the utilitarian he decries. He uses many examples of how our current system is based on economics, but fails to provide independent reasoning as to why it should.