Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Self-Interest and Smith's Moral Theory

Smith absolutely intrigues me as his theory of moral sentiments seems to be a direct challenge to the conception of self-interest as the sole motivating factor of human behavior in a marketplace (a concept that many proponents of Smith attribute to his The Wealth of Nations). The idea of moral-decision making most definitely complicates the idea of self-interest, and selfishness in some senses, as a guide to human interaction in a commercial society as posed by Smith in The Wealth of Nations, by Posner, and by Gauthier.

Yet, I argue that Smith can reconcile his idea of self-interest with his theory of moral sentiments. One quote in particular stuck out to me is: “the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved” (41). As an individual can only be beloved when others sympathize with his joys, and in turn feel happiness themselves, an individual will pursue those actions that bring him joy (and by extension bring others joy). Smith attributes it to human nature that individuals want to feel joy in order to find tranquility of mind. When phrased this way the concept of moral-decision making seems very close to the idea that individuals will act in ways that benefits their own preferences in a competitive society. An individual will seek greatness in order to feel joy, and the impartial spectator that is society sympathizes with her and also feels this joy. In this case, the individual pursuing joy is benefiting herself while also benefiting others in their pursuit for tranquility of the mind. Not only does this interpretation of Smith’s theory reinforce the pursuit of self-interest, it also expands the concept of self-interest, encompassing those actions that would be deemed as “moral” by the impartial spectator (i.e. which the impartial spectator would approve of by expressing sympathy towards that individual). In this sense, it is in the self-interest of individuals to act morally, infusing economic thought with ethics, a position that Sen would definitely advocate.

Furthermore, I appreciate Smith’s theory of moral sentiments as it does not closely resemble other moral philosophical thought. At first, while reading, I thought the book should be described as psychology rather than moral philosophy. However, I have now come to consider Smith’s normative theory as integral to describing human behavior as it is, why it is that way, and what it should be in certain circumstances. How else to justify why we make moral judgments the way we do besides looking at exactly our thought processes in regards to interactions with other humans? Smith grounds his theory in reality, explaining the circumstances in which we express sympathy, and those in which we do not, as well as the circumstances when we can express all the emotion we want, and other instances when we should definitely dial it down if we want anyone to ever talk to us again. I see Smith’s theory as a direct appeal not to moral intuitions, but to emotional intuitions that guide our everyday interactions with others.




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