Throughout the
reading Brettschneider brings up an interesting notion where he distinguishes
substantive rights from procedural rights in a theory of democracy. His
explanation on the distinction of these two types of rights provide a unique
twist to the reading by relating such to human dignity and “metaphysical”
qualities. Nevertheless, before delving
into Brettschneider’s argument I would like to first clarify his perspective on
The Value Theory of Democracy. In the reading, Brettschneider defines The Value
of Democracy as “the core values that require the guarantee of substantive
individual rights as well as rights to participate in democratic procedures”
(9). By use of the word “substantive,” Brettschneider emphasizes how rights are
rather “distinct from democratic procedures but central to the ideal of
democracy” (9). Although Brettschneider goes on to elaborate on human and
natural rights, I strive to understand what he means by procedural democracy and ideal
democracy? How does he determine what is ideal? Is one more structural or
mechanical/unnatural than the other?
Rachelle,
ReplyDeleteI think he uses the ideal of democracy to refer to his three core values of democracy. He suggests in the paper that a pure procedural democracy has apparent flaw if it is not constrained by certain procedural-independent values. A procedural democracy only appeal to people's instrumental value. An ideal democracy is better in the way that it acknowledges that people has more value than merely instrumental value (as Hampton would say - intrinsic value).