A Difficult Endeavor

Harris calls out Brown v Board for failing to, at the very least, address the “de facto white privilege not mandated by law.” She states that although the court ordered the desegregation of schools, they failed to truly recognize the entrenched privilege of the white people still in charge of those schools. She further claims the purpose of affirmative action is to grant people of color the jobs they would have were the playing field fair. Harris puts a much larger burden on the government than it has been willing to take in the past, and it is difficult to judge if the government would be right in making the expansions she calls for.

The problem is made more difficult in the view of the contentious definitions of black and white. Harris contends that race is not an objective, measureable thing, but instead is deeply embedded in history and culture. She condemns the early slavery laws, which attempt to define blackness exactly what makes a person black, from mixed parentage to a “single drop” of black blood. She also denies the title of black to two men who identified themselves as black on an application, due merely to the race of their great-grandfather. On the ruling of a judge which claims a group of Native Americans to not be a tribe due to the mixing of their blood, she asserts that the court failed to recognize the construction of their tribe as anything more than a biological fact. It is plain that Harris does not regard race as solely a biological fact, but as a mixture of culture, background, and history. Unfortunately, this makes even more difficult the discussion of what affirmative action is appropriate. No doubt Harris would feel that a “passing” woman such as her grandmother would be deserving of affirmative action, that her grandmother suffered immeasurably from the pain of hiding her identity. Undoubtedly, Harris would deny to a woman such as Rachel Dorzel, the white leader of a chapter of the NAACP, who passed as black for many years. There are obviously, however, many in between these two cases, and the difficulty lies in determining who, exactly, is deserving of the intervention of affirmative action.

Harris states, quite correctly, that the only reason there is unfair representation of people of color in schools and businesses is because of white privilege. If, she states, one accepts that people are born inherently equal, then there must be little other reason for unequal representation. Therefore, affirmative action is just because of its nature of being distributive justice, that is, it correct wrongs still being perpetuated. It is not, she claims nearly so important for affirmative action to be corrective justice, or justice which seeks to correct harms done to ancestors. Therefore, because Harris believes both that wrongs are still being done, and that whites that overwhelmingly populate positions of power did not fairly earn their positions, Harris is effectively putting a moral burden on the government and those businesses and schools engaged in affirmative action to determine who it is that would have occupied those positions were the playing field equal. These places must not simply give preference to undervalued people of color, but to determine exactly who on the playing field does not belong.

This sounds kind of familiar...

            Throughout history, those who have possessed ‘superior’ characteristics (white, male) have always constructed the ‘inferior other’, whether it be the other gender (female), the other race (African American, Native American), etc. Although these assignments have been justified on the basis of biology through pseudo-scientific reasoning, many (myself included) would argue that these assignments are mainly social constructs. Perhaps we have reached the point where we no longer have to legitimize these distinctions that play into power structures. Now that we are finally enlightened, we can deem ourselves colorblind and forget about these arbitrary distinctions. Right?

            Wrong.

            Harris argues, quite convincingly, that there presently exist disparate material and non-material (i.e. value of whiteness) inequalities between races. Furthermore, these gross inequalities are the product of systematic racial subordination. Our current political system is not ‘neutral’ nor just, as many suppose that it is in cases of opposition to affirmative action (and everyday life). The dissonance between reality (a state of gross inequality) and society’s constructed view of itself (as neutral or fair) is a product of expectations of white privilege that have been reinforced by our legislative and judicial branches.

            I find it difficult not to relate this to the recent demonstrations that have occurred at CMC. Though it is difficult to gauge how many ‘dissent’, I believe that there are an overwhelming number of people who feel at odds with those who call for serious administrative/institutional reforms. This reading evoked one significant problem that I have with dissenters: they don’t see the need for an ethnic/racial/sexuality-centered GE.

            To many white people (certainly not all), the idea that POC at CMC have serious grievances with their quality of life may disrupt their expectations of the CMC community or society. Perhaps they become defensive and feel, as many ‘victims’ of affirmative action feel, that the burden to correct injustices does not lie on any one of them individually.

            A class that includes material on power structures and systematic oppression of the races/genders may serve to inform those who are disillusioned—white supremacy exists in society. The United States has a history of subordinating races/genders domestically as well as through imperial endeavors. Furthermore, it may convince them that these systematic injustices can (and should) be corrected through programs that serve to balance the playing field/fix existing inequalities such as affirmative action in hiring faculty (like Harris says, affirmative action is meant to address institutional inequalities on a broad level—it is not meant to ‘victimize’ innocent white people.)

            The addition of a GE is, in itself, an structural change that may balance out a sea of white, male voices that dominate other GE fields such as Philosophy, Government, the Sciences, and, of course, Economics.

The Right to Exclude

Cheryl Harris presents a brilliant and compelling account of whiteness as property within the United States through a detailed account of the history of racial discrimination and accrued inequalities.

I have two questions to ask:

1. If, according to our discussion around Locke, government exists to protect individual property rights and the vast majority of currently owned property in the United States is a result of illegitimate, systematic, government sanctioned racism - then, since the acquisition of this property necessarily infringed on the property rights of others (non-white), is it not the duty and only end of our government to protect those violated in the form of reparations?

2. I would like to understand Harris' argument about (d) The Absolute Rights to Exclude on page 1736.

Harris states that "the right to exclude was the central principle ...  of whiteness as identity; for mainly whiteness has been characterized, not by an inherent unifying characteristic, but by the exclusion of others deemed to be 'not white.' The possessors of whiteness were granted the legal right to exclude others from the privileges inhering in whiteness; whiteness became an exclusive club whose membership was closely and grudgingly guarded" (1736).

Harris' claim is accurate - whiteness was created in opposition to blackness and formed this exclusive club she talks about. When Locke talked about the right to exclude, he references eating a berry. According to Locke, when a man eats a berry off a bush the berry “must be his” and thereby "excludes the common right of other men" because “another can no longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of life” (sec 26). In the berry example, by eating a berry, I exclude your right to eat the berry simply because it is physically impossible for both you and I to derive benefit from the berry. At first glance, whiteness could not be like this berry - by being white, you don't thereby veto another's ability to be white - there is no physical limit on this. But, as Harris points out, the value of whiteness is not in whiteness - it is in the creation of an exclusive club. It seems similar to the value accorded to intellectual property - the actual value of intellectual property is the right to exclude others. Is granting the right to exclude for 'whiteness' like granting a right to exclude others from eating any berry simply because you ate one berry? The property is the right to exclude others?

A New Perspective on "Passing"

Cheryl Harris’ emphasis on “passing” in the beginning of the reading immediately caught my attention. As Harris elaborates on her grandmother’s struggle with her White and Black identities, she writes, “Passing is well-known among Black people in the United States and is a feature of race subordination in all societies structured on white supremacy” (Harris 1712). Harris’ grandmother interestingly enough has the physical characteristics to “pass” as a White woman, yet she is a Black woman by nature. While her fake white identity put’s her at an economic and political advantage, such a mask, per se, truly serves her as an emotional burden because she lives a lie, or rather double life. Harris’ use of the word “passing” in the previous quote reveals the great division between Whites and Blacks. There is a certain line or limit one must reach to obtain specific privileges, known as white privilege, and not face brutal discrimination. It is unfortunate that Blacks in our country must live with this notion of “passing” in order to fit in and achieve their goals. The phrase “race subordination” is also significant as it proves there is a societal rank based on one’s color of skin. Additionally, consider the following quote Harris portrays as she continues to discuss privilege: “…guaranteed basic subsistence needs and, therefore, survival. Becoming white increased the possibility of controlling critical aspects of one’s life rather than being the object of the others’ domination” (Harris 1713). The words “survival”, “controlling” and “object” are key. “Survival” and “controlling” show how being white is almost essential and most preferable to living a decent life. It is nearly impossible to obtain authority and confidence if one is not white as they become powerless and rather regarded as “objects.” I am curious to better comprehend the evolution of white supremacy. How can we abolish it and why is the United States the only country with the most difficultly in this aspect?

Blackness as Property

Cheryl Harris states over and over again in her paper that whiteness is a property that bring white people many kinds of advantages. The skin color of white people has evolved from a sign of freedom, to a value and a right, to an advantageous position of power, selection, and resources allocation, and ultimately to the legitimacy of avoid affirmative actions. When Harris mentions the skin color of African population, she never uses blackness; instead, she uses black identity. Then a question occurs to me: is blackness a property?

From her refusal to use the word “blackness”, I assume that she does not regard blackness as a property. But as Locke said, “every man has a property in his own person (Of Property).” If whiteness is a part of the white people and a property of them; ceteris paribus, blackness should be a part of the black people and a property of them too. To fully investigate this question, I will then examine blackness through the same criteria that Harris used in part II-C in “Whiteness as Property.”

1)    Blackness as a traditional form of property: As a traditional form of property, certain rights of a person is determined because of his/her color (1726). Whiteness can bring some exclusive rights to white people, whereas blackness can deprive some rights from black people. Even though blackness cannot bring advantages to African American people, their rights are determined by their skin color.

2)    Blackness as property to define social relations: Blackness does influence people’s power selection, and allocation; therefore, it is a modern-view property.

3)    Blackness and expectation: Property is often associated with certain expectations. Similar to whiteness, people often generate certain expectations to blackness. Differently, the expectation of whiteness is often desirable whereas the expectation of blackness is undesirable.

4)    The property functions of blackness:

a.     Right of Disposition: Blackness is a property so long as whiteness is a property.

b.     Right to Use and Enjoyment: The right exists de jure and is usable, but nobody enjoys de facto. This is the only right that is hard to justify.

c.     Reputation and Status Property: As written in page 1735, to call someone “Black” is to defame someone. Blackness is associated with certain impression or reputation.

d.     The Absolute Right to Exclude: It is apparent that one’s skin color only belongs to oneself.

I believe that the distinction between Harris’ view and my view lies in the definition of property. Harris thinks property can only bring benefits to its owner, whereas I regard property as an attribute. Whether it is beneficial or destructive does not make a difference so long as it makes certain impact to the person. In a mathematical model, Harris would only acknowledge any positive numbers as numbers. On the contrary, I would acknowledge all numbers, both positive and negative.

Redefining "Merit"

In her article, Cheryl Harris describes whiteness as a form of property. To accentuate her argument for whiteness as property, Harris calls on the Lockean view of property. Locke’s claim that "every man has a 'property' in his own 'person,"(Sec. 118, Two Treatises) prompted the assertion that an individual’s own physical self was her or his property. Harris continues with the idea that whiteness is property by asserting that being white or “passing” as white, provides an individual with certain legal, material and social benefits. For Harris, whiteness as property has permeated throughout the US’s legal system (for example through ideas of property laws). Furthermore, whiteness has permitted individuals to material privileges such as can be access to better higher education, and social entitlements such as the setting the standards for group identity.

Most notably, recent Supreme Court decisions regarding affirmative action have failed to dismantle whiteness as property. Harris argues that these cases fail to reconstruct the notion of who “merits” education. The point that I thought was particularly apt was Harris’ redefined idea of merit. Many of the recent Court cases claim that affirmative action creates a preference for diversity over merit, and that this preference undermines the quality of higher educational institutions. Most often, merit is equated with statistical data such as GPA and test scores, seemingly unbiased data (which one can argue is biased as there are significant barriers to exceeding in this criteria if one has not been afforded quality education or adequate test preparation). However, Harris questions why only these specific data points should be considered when assessing merit. Harris calls on the reader to rethink the definition of merit when she posits that the traditional definition of merit is a “part of the natural order of things that cannot legitimately be disturbed” (1778). Merit as a concept instead should be seen through the “distribute justice lens, …on…the proper allocation in the absence of the distortion of racial oppression” (1784). Echoing Harris, just because we have always recognized merit one way, what merits this particular definition of merit, especially if the concept was set up under a system determined by certain white ideals? I agree with Harris that the concept of merit is too narrowly defined and, if it is to be used as one of the highest weighted factors in higher education admissions, should be reevaluated. 

The State of War Continued

“This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive.”

As I read Locke’s description of the state of war, I began to wonder: how will he be able to justify what is clearly a perpetuated state of war – the enslavement of Africans and Native Americans by Europeans settling in the New World. The Second Treatise was published in 1690, and slavery in the New World was well established, so he could not possibly neglect to mention it, or at the very least put forth his two cents on slavery and whether or not it is justified. Locke posits that anyone who is put into slavery (or is subject of an attempt to do so) must for their own preservation act according to the state of war, since that is the sphere in which the aggressor is acting. By this logic, Africans and Native Americans, then, should have had the authority, under the state of war in which the Europeans were acting, to retaliate fully by killing them.

I read on, turning the page to discover that the fourth chapter dealt specifically with slavery, hoping to see Locke address this head-on and at least provide some justification for slavery, but was disappointed to find no such rationalization. I can only assume that the rationalization would be that Africans and Native Americans did not fall into the same level of humanity as Europeans. His example of the Jews willingly selling themselves into “drudgery” in Exodus would not, in my mind, be sufficient to explain the enslavement of Africans or Native Americans.