Token and Type Property Rights according to Pogge
Today, the term "right to property" is used broadly to apply to a myriad of political issues, but Pogge not only shows the difference between token property rights and type property rights. When Locke defends the right to property, he is talking about the right to token property. Abraham Lincoln describes the right to token property as the most obvious right: "[even the] ant, who has toiled and dragged a crumb to his nest, will furiously defend the fruit of his labor, against whatever robber assails him." The debate over token property rights surfaces in questions regarding tax policy and eminent domain. This blog post will focus on the right to property and how it plays into Pogge's debate on patents.
The right to token property is very different from the right to type property. The right to type property says that if a person invents a product, be it a drug, new iPhone, or book franchise, the government guarantees that no one will copy their work and diminish their profits. The right to type property typically around patents and copyright. Continuing Lincoln's parable, the first ant to drag the crumb to its nest does not have the monopoly on all crumbs.
Pogge points out that the right to token property and the right to type property not only are not identical, but they can conflict. Suppose I am the first person to add ketchup to my scrambled eggs. I like the idea so much that I patent ketchup with scrambled eggs, and I now have the type property rights over the dish. If someone else - knowingly or not - copies my idea, their scrambled eggs with ketchup - token property - gets taken away.
The distinction between type and token property rights comes into Pogge's analysis when Pogge analyzes the GBD (Global Burden of Disease) on the world, particularly on developing countries. Pogge argues that the GBD would be lower if some drug companies lost their monopoly on certain drugs. In theory, Pogge's argument that a monopoly chases away some buyers from the market is sound. The quantity of customers in the market at the optimal monopoly price is lower than the quantity of customers in the market at a competitive market price. The deadweight loss - these customers and their money - as well as the loss of the positive externality - the inoculation effects of a drug on a population - is a problem.
The takeaway from Pogge's analysis is as follows: In choosing to break up the monopoly, one makes a value judgment. This judgment is between the type property rights of the company versus the societal good that comes with breaking up the monopoly. Pogge understands that nullifying patent laws - choosing the societal good over the type property rights - diminishes the incentive for companies to continue innovating. After all, companies, such as Pfizer, spend a great deal of money brainstorming, testing, and manufacturing their products. If another company shortcuts the innovative process, they skirt the costs that accompany failure. As such, the greater economic benefit follows the spinoff company that pirates the original company's work. Pogge does present alternatives, the aptly named "push" and "pull" alternatives, but both of these plans, as Pogge admits, have their drawbacks.
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