In 125 pages of vagaries, Beitz manages “more or less” to
describe a practice of human rights, and why it is certainly superior to one
founded on a philosophical basis, among other alternatives. Beitz’ conclusion
in the third chapter has two parts: “The first is to show that the inferences
drawn from naturalistic conceptions about the contents and basis of
international human rights are normative positions requiring a defense; it is a
mistake to regard them as analytic. The second is to raise doubt about the
relevance of such an exercise to the main dilemmas about international human
rights.” (72) Specifically, he outlines four features of “natural rights”: that
their force does not depend on the morals and laws set out by a society; that
they are “pre-institutional”; that everyone is privy to them at all times and
places; and that humans have these rights because of our intrinsic value. (52-3)
Later, when proposing his “practical conception,” he determines that it must
encompass the following: it must “seek to represent a consensus among competent
participants”; it should “rely on a conception of the practice’s aim or purpose
in order to adjudicate among conflicting beliefs about the practical
significance of its central terms or to resolve ambiguities about their
meanings”; it should be broad enough to allow for disagreement within the
practice; and that this disagreement within the practice is helpful and
necessary to the growth of the practice.” (107-8) Finally, he defines the three
elements of his two-level model, which operates on the level of states and the
international community as actors: “Human rights are requirements whose object
is to protect urgent individual interests against certain predictable dangers…
Human rights apply in the first instance to the political institutions of
states, including their constitutions, laws, and public policies… Human rights
are a matter of international concern.” (109)
Since “naturalistic conceptions… [require] a defense,”
here goes. Of course, I’ll be using Ripstein as my example. First, a
naturalistic conception can absolutely be analytic. The principle of equal
individual freedom can easily be used to analyze the moral standing of any
action or decision, simply by asking the question: “Does this respect the equal
claims on freedom that everyone involved has?” Of course, Beitz wants to
distance himself from moral claims. In fact, one of the strongest arguments he
makes, in my opinion, is the following: “This does not mean that we need no
reasons to care about human rights – only that it is not part of the practice
that everyone who accepts and acts upon the public doctrine must share the same
reasons for doing so.” (104) I will address this after looking at the four
features of “natural rights.” The first feature, that natural rights cannot
depend on definition by the state, can be answered as such: if I want to be
treated a certain way (e.g. not be killed, or have other harms done to me), I
have no choice but to treat you in that way. I cannot reasonably make a claim
that I deserve freedom while simultaneously denying your equal claim to it.
This is a compact between you and me and comes before the state’s laws or
morals, which also addresses the second feature. The third feature ties into
the same compact. It does not matter time or place. If I want my claims on
freedom respected, I must respect yours. Finally, more than any compact, we all
deserve to have our equal claim on freedom respected because we are humans. If
I deny this premise, I simultaneous devalue my own claim on freedom. To address
the above concern about heterogeneity of approaches, we can each have
individual reasons for respecting equal individual freedom, but we must all do
it if we wish to have our own respected.
Moving on to his practical conception, a consensus among
competent individuals would be best represented by one in which everyone’s
equal individual claim on freedom is respected. In this sense, it actually
makes sense to enter into a Rawlsian original position. I won’t cut the cake in
any way that gives one person a greater claim on freedom because, picking last,
I know that I’ll get a lesser claim. Evaluating claims on equal individual
freedom also creates a nice “conception of the practice’s aim” for judging
between inner disputes. It is broad enough to allow for internal disagreement,
and this disagreement surely will lead to a more thorough understanding of what
equal individual freedom means in any given context. Finally, the concept of respecting
equal claims on freedom can easily be applied to the three elements of Beitz’
two-level model, and to the sub-elements that comprise it.
I don’t mean to say all this in the belief that Beitz is
wrong. However, I believe that he disregards the practicality of an underlying
philosophical standard from which human rights can be derived. As he alludes to
earlier in the book, there can be such things as first- and second- order rights
that come as a naturalistic interpretation moves from a pre-state level to one
including states. The premise of equal individual freedom is that it can be
interpreted at its most basic level before states, that I will not kill you if
you do not kill me, and can become much more comprehensive and powerful once
states and the international community build up a practice around it. It can
begin to include more specific rights as the process moves along. I agree with
Beitz that it is hard to say that anyone has any rights in the state of nature;
we are animals, after all, and our principle purpose, thanks to evolutionary
adaptations, is to survive and multiply. This has no claims on any rights at
all. However, if a practice of rights is to begin, some form of interaction
between parties must be present, and that starts with me not killing you, and
you doing the same, thus establishing for the first time a respect for each
other’s equal claims on freedom.
Lastly, on an unrelated
note, I want to thank you all for a wonderful semester. I can’t remember the
last class that I genuinely looked forward to attending as much as I have this
class. I wasn’t sure about applying to PPE, but made the decision to do so on a
gut feeling, and it’s paid off every day since. Similarly, I was nervous when I
didn’t know the members of our track as well as I knew the others, but it’s
been an absolute pleasure getting to know all of you through our academic
endeavors, and becoming both inside and outside of the classroom. I will
certainly miss you guys while I’m in Ecuador next semester!
