This post is similar to Henry’s post
in the sense that I don’t necessarily buy this practical conception and I might
in fact prefer a philosophical basis for human rights (but who really knows????).
Throughout chapter 3, Beitz compares
various naturalistic theories against the existing international human rights
doctrine, oftentimes in an effort to point out how naturalistic theories are incompatible with the current doctrine. Originally, I was not convinced that the contemporary theory provides
an authoritative baseline for comparison—it
is not based on any principle that provides constraints for the content of
human rights, but is the result of some persons’ agreement on what constitutes
human rights. On pages 67-68, however, Beitz explains why using a
philosophical conception in lieu of simply interpreting international human
rights as currently presented is wrong—or at least requires a justification:
It
is essential to take seriously the aspiration for a normative doctrine suitable
for contemporary international life and open to endorsement from a variety of
reasonable points of view. It would be consonant with this aspiration to think
of an idea of human status or functioning as providing a basis for at least
some of the protection embodied in international doctrine. But to rely on these
conceptions to interpret the idea of a human right at the center of
international doctrine—that requires a justification (Beitz 68).
According to
Beitz, although one can use normative doctrines to inform international
doctrine, it cannot be its only basis. And if one does use normative doctrines,
he/she needs a justification.
After pointing out many weaknesses
in both naturalistic theories and agreement theories, Beitz presents his theory
of “emergent” human rights. In chapter 5, Beitz describes his practical
conception of human rights—a conception that “seeks not only to grasp its aims
but also to appraise their importance and to construe the practice in light of
this judgment” (105). Going back to my initial concern: according to his
account of this practical conception, one can constrain human rights practices
using the idea of aims; anything that is not consonant with the aims of human
rights/is not “suited to the public political role” will not be put into
practice (105).
I find this mechanism for
constraining the content of human rights extremely unsatisfactory—and somewhat
arbitrary. What if persons differ in their opinions on the purposes/aims of
human rights (for example, one person believes the state should extend to
guaranteeing education and another believes the state should not extend that
far)? What are the ramifications for the scope of human rights? Isn’t the
purpose of constraining human rights to establish the boundaries of what is
acceptable and what is not acceptable? I think that the value of a philosophical basis lies in its ability to dictate and constrain content. I am not quite sure his practical approach really does this.
Alexia,
ReplyDeleteI completely agree with the sentiment of skepticism in your post. However, I think that Beitz might see this as a bite the bullet sort of situation. He says, "because a practical conception prescinds from taking any philosophical view about the nature or basis of human rights, it can distinguish between the problem of conceptualizing human rights and that of understanding their authority" (103). He seems to pose that a practical conception sacrifices other characteristics that we may think central to human rights in order to be successfully practical. Because, ultimately, what is the value of any discourse on human rights if there is no real practical action resulting from it: "an understanding of this public role constrains the content of the doctrine" (105). Thus, I think that many of your worries embodied in your final questions are grounded in a disagreement between what constrains would be necessary in order to have a full public role type doctrine of human rights.
I think the reason that this disagreement is so important is that, though Beitz presents a good argument for why it is necessary to constrain the doctrine throughout the chapters, it is somewhat unsettling. Of course there are certain rights that in the practice of international enforcement will lack the justification necessary to ensure enforcement, such as with your example of education. And if we are hung up on all of these shortcomings, we are distracting ourselves from the true aim of human rights. However, it seems that in accepting Beitz position, we are almost accepting that human rights will progress naturally over time and to try to rush to guarantee a broad scope of human rights to everyone by going beyond the practical conception is unpractical and possibly not the right thing to do. Even though it may be inefficient to spend time wishing that we had a better conception of human rights that better established the boundaries of 'what is acceptable and what is not acceptable,' I think that this cannot be said to be the wrong thing to do.