Brettschneider posits that one of the core values of
democracy is reciprocity. To Brettschneider, reciprocity is “the notion that
policies governing citizens’ treatment must be defensible by appeal to
arguments that reasonable citizens
can accept” (25). I take issue with Brettschneider’s appeal to reasonableness
to justify reciprocity as a core value of democracy. While the core values of
democracy are upheld, including equality of citizens, political autonomy, and
reciprocity, citizens might have differing views regarding “reasonable”
policies and treatment. Due to these differing views, wouldn’t there need to be
some sort of principle to reconcile citizens’ differing conceptions of the
reasonable? Brettschneider claims that his value theory of democracy is
superior to other democratic theories, as it does not impose one comprehensive
view, or one conception of the good, in the name of democracy. Brettschneider
sees a problem in proposing one conception of the good as superior to all
others as it would subordinate democratic institutions “to one particular
comprehensive view…[and] would impose external rule on citizens who,
reasonably, did not share that view,” thus going against the ideal of
democracy, self rule (19). However, I see an inconsistency in his argument once
Brettschneider introduces the third value of democracy, reciprocity, and its
definition. Again, how would Brettschneider think one should deal with the
differing conceptions of reasonableness? If he proposes one ideal of
reasonableness that all citizens should follow, wouldn’t his claim that his
value theory of democracy is superior to all other democratic theories thus be void?
The idea of ‘reasonableness’ is very interesting, especially in light of the vagueness of Scanlon’s appeal to ‘reasonableness’ from Jean Hampton’s Feminist Contractarianism. However, unlike Scanlon, I think that Brettschneider provides some content to the idea of reasonableness. On page 25, Brettschneider writes, “reciprocal justification should appeal to citizen’s common values of autonomy and equality to discern the limits of coercion”. I take this to mean that in determining whether or not a policy can be accepted by “reasonable citizens” (25), one must decide whether or not the policy violates the other core values of equality and autonomy. In fact, Brettschneider refers to it as “an organizing value because it suggests how to apply the other two core values” (25). If this is the case, perhaps the idea of reasonable may become vague in instances when the core values are in conflict with each other. So while the idea of reasonable possesses more content than Scanlon’s idea of reasonable, I can see why you would identify potential problems with the term.
ReplyDeleteThe footnote on page 35 also pertains to the idea of reasonableness and suggests that one can avoid the “potentially circular” nature of the word by generating “criteria for reasonableness by appealing to… a sense of the good and a sense of justice”. I am not sure whether this footnote pertains solely to Rawls’ idea of reasonable—nonetheless, it is interesting that he identifies this specific problem.
Isabella,
ReplyDeleteIt seems like Brettschneider offers some kind of an answer to your concern about peoples' "differing views regarding “reasonable” policies and treatment" in footnote #34, the first one on page 25. In explaining a similar view on reciprocity from Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Brettschneider quotes them to state that "reciprocity requires that 'citizens try to offer reasons that other similarly motivated citizens can accept even though they recognize that they share only some of one another's values'" (25).
In this footnote, I see Brettschneider acknowledging that citizens might have different opinions about which policies are reasonable and which are not, but that reciprocity only requires that you attempt (not necessarily succeed, because that will not always be possible since people do have different opinions) to offer an explanation based on your own conception of reasonableness that will appeal to others based on whatever common ground they do share with you.