According to Nagel, justice is strictly political, not moral
in nature. Justice is only possible under one sovereign ruler that both represents
its citizens and enforces decisions made by its citizens. Nagel argues that
only once there is an associative link between individuals solidified by
institutions, as is the case between citizens of a society, can there be any
claims to socioeconomic justice. Because there is no world regime, and Nagel
furthermore does not believe a world regime is feasible, justice between
individuals of different states is impossible. Therefore, while “everyone may
have a right to live in a just society…we do not have an obligation to live in
a just society with everyone. The right to justice is the right that the
society one lives in be justly governed” (132).
I want to bring up the point I made in my last blot post
regarding the neglect of taking into account the effects of colonialism and
imperialism, as I do not believe Nagel defeats this counterargument. Nagel claims that global justice is not
possible because citizens in different societies owe nothing to one another on
moral grounds, as there are no associative links between citizens of different
states. I would like to push back on this claim. Many countries experiencing
great growth and wealth did so on the backs of poor nations. Moreover, wealthy
countries colonized other territories and effectively added the citizens of
these territories under their sovereignty. Those areas that were colonized were
then left to their own devices after withstanding corruption and extraction
from more powerful nations are often the countries that currently experience
extreme poverty. Nagel’s account of global justice does not address the fact
that sovereignty was at one point extended to these countries currently
experiencing extreme poverty. And, more importantly, nor does it address the
developed nations' role in this devastation of other countries, which is, in
effect, an associative link between the citizens of the developed countries and
the citizens of the poorest nations in the world. Citizens in developed countries were able to
prosper, and are still able to prosper, to the detriment of the citizens in
previously colonized areas. I am curious to see what Nagel’s response to this
counterargument would be. Would he consider the effects of colonialism and
post-colonialism to provide associative links between individuals? If not, how
would Nagel justify colonialism and its consequences?
While Nagel’s argument contemplates the role of obligation,
whereas Sen’s argument overlooks this important point, to me, he comes up with
an unsatisfactory answer that perpetuates the world order status quo.
Not a substantial comment, but I want to say that I whole heartedly agree.
ReplyDeleteIsabella,
ReplyDeleteI think you raise very important questions, and that your post looks at association from an opposite point of view. You make the claim that the "developed nation's role in [the] devastation of other countries" serves as an associative link "between the citizens of the developed countries and the citizens of the poorest nations in the world." In response, I think that Nagel would argue that the more developed nation's willingness to allow the colonized nation suffer serves as proof that no associative link exists (or a very weak link, at the least).
To provide further context, I think that it would be helpful to revisit Nagel's international trade example. He discusses how the relationship we share with individuals who provide labor overseas is weaker than the relationship we feel with individuals who provide domestic labor. This is because the relation overseas "remains essentially one of bargaining" that is grounded in the pursuit of self-interest (141). The same can be said of your colonization example. The colonizer uses the colonized as a means to pursue its own ends. Thus, citizens of the colonized territory will suffer due to the lack of the colonizer's desire to provide socioeconomic justice.
Furthermore, our tendency to characterize a colony as a distinctly detached entity provides further evidence that the two are linked by weaker associative means, similarly to how we come to draw distinctions between nations associated by a loose system of networks.