Harmonious Individuality

1.) Universalization reminds me of Frank's analysis of Norms

Anderson states that it is "a constitutive principle of a collective agent ... that whatever can count as a reason for action for one member of the collective must count as a reason for all" (29). Essentially, she states, when members are viewed under a single collective agency, "the parties are committed to acting only on reasons that are universalizable to their membership" (29). Anderson then goes on to show how this "universalization principle rules out the principle of maximizing expected utility (individual preference satisfaction) as an acceptable principle of rational choice for members of a collective agency who constitute the parties to a prisoner's dilemma" (29).

To help us unpack this, Anderson states that reasons are essentially "principles" that are rational for "us" to adopt and thus "rational for any individual who identifies as a member of that group to act on" (24). This is Anderson's conception of "committed action" (24). Interestingly, Anderson references Sen who identified "social conventions" and "norms" as reasons for actions contrary to theories of maximizing utility (28).

I want to examine the interplay between Anderson's account of committed action and Frank's account of social norms. Frank uses the example of steroid use in sports. Under Anderson's account, those who identify as Upstanding Athletes have reasons (not wanting to destroy their body) which are rational for the group ("us") to adopt and therefore are rational for each individual who identifies as an upstanding athlete to act on. This seems intuitive that it would be irrational for athletes to engage in a positional arms race of bodily destruction.

That being said, there are social norms that are not necessarily beneficial overall:

Frank uses the example of a grading curve. All cool students have reasons (not wanting to work/study too hard) which are rational for all the cool students to adopt and is therefore rational for each cool student to act on. Yet, this seems like a bad thing overall (this part is touched on by Alexia's example below), so how does bad equal rational?

Anderson takes the argument further:

2.) Group Collisions lead to Individuality

Anderson states that by "identifying with one group, we may thereby preclude identifying with another group" (32). That is, essentially, various identities compete for better reasons to act. In lieu of a new or different identity, you choose to act on the most compelling or best reason that you have within your identities.

Extending the student example, a competing identity could be Frank's "nerd" identity, or "high performing student" identity. A student might hold this identity if their parents or teachers inculcated in them a sense of the importance of education. Anderson argues that individuality "emerges out of a certain kind of social order" that is composed of "multiple, distinct spheres of social life" which no individual part wholly enslaves their owner. That is, individuality arises out of the ability to "adjudicate ... conflicts" between held identities. Thus, we achieve individual identity when we are able to create a balance between the competing identities of 'cool student' and 'high performing student.' What is essential, however, is that the conditions for exposure to both identities exists in the first place. Otherwise, "their priorities are set by the commitments of the collective agency to which they belong, and hence it is not up to them to set their priorities on their own" (36).

Interestingly, it would seem, individuality is to be liberated from the tyranny of a single identity; freedom is to be exposed to multiple identities.

3.) Individuality leads to a higher moral order

I love Anderson's conclusion about Rawls' 'social union of social unions' and Kant's 'kingdom of ends.' Anderson argues that to "harmonize the demands of different groups requires the adoption of a perspective that can coordinate them all" would be to finally realize the "point which rationality coincides with morality" (37). What I find fascinating is that individuality requires the balancing of identities -- that is, a single identity compromises the very existence of individuality. Early in the reading, Anderson classified "self-interest" or the "principle of expected utility" as an identity on page 31 -- arguing that, under certain circumstances, it is an appropriate identity. BUT, if it is our only identity (cough cough Posner), then we sacrifice our individuality and thus, our higher moral order. The balancing of identities naturally leads to something much less radical than to adopt a singular identity -- it seems almost tautological that morality requires the balancing of different identities. It reminds me of the conclusion of Plato's The Republic that, basically, justice is harmony; likewise, it seems so natural that morality would be a macro-harmony of identities adjudicated on a micro-level by genuine individuals acting on a series of tradeoffs between their collective reasons for doing so.