I really enjoyed the Strawson article (once I managed to get a handle on what he was saying which was not an easy feat), and the way that Strawson flips the determinist question on its head. Instead of attempting to answer the question "is determinism true?" he instead poses "does determinism fit in with our established conceptions of how we view one another?". By appealing to our moral intuitions (like Smith), he builds a theory of interpersonal relationships, detailing that because humans are incapable of conceiving of life after proving determinism true, determinism cannot be true. Strawson bases his theory on an account of actual human perceptions and conduct instead of theorizing how we ought to act based on some vague concept claiming our actions and decisions are not products of our own capabilities and reasoning.
In his article, Strawson argues that there are certain groups of people that are "outside" the "moral community" as we understand it (86). These individuals are exceptions to the standard situation in which we take the reactive stance and judge interactions based on our own beliefs and perceptions about ourselves and the other individual. Whereas we demand goodwill from "normal" individuals, certain individuals we believe cannot be the "object of that kind of demand for goodwill or regard which is reflected in our ordinary reactive attitudes" (78). These certain individuals are those who lack typical emotional capacities (i.e. psychotic), those who are children, those in abnormal circumstances due to stress or those who had negative formative experiences. These "abnormal" individuals are thus outside of the moral community as the "normal" individuals understand it and should be treated differently and viewed objectively in their actions."Normal" individuals see "abnormal" individuals as "an object of social policy...of something to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided" (79).
Strawson thus establishes that certain individuals can be outside of the moral community and these individuals should be viewed with the understanding that their actions are not their own, that instead they are a product of abnormality or bad formative experiences. Where does that leave us when dealing with those who know what they are doing is wrong but consistently do so anyway (like serial killers for example)? I don't see how we can call these permanently apathetic individuals totally outside the expectations of the "normal" moral community. Let's say there is a serial killer who got off once because of a mistrial and during the trial many individuals claimed what a horrendous act it was to kill innocent people. In his trial, he claimed that he had a bad childhood and was never taught the proper differences between right and wrong. This acquitted serial killer then goes back into the world and starts killing more people again, despite the fact others told him it was wrong. How should we view him? We could take the objective view and blame his immoral actions to his bad upbringing. Yet, he was brought back into the "moral community" and told his actions were wrong, correcting his undeveloped moral compass. So then should we view him reactively, as a "normal" individual and punish him consequently? Basically, should we hold this individual morally responsible?
This flip-flop ability of switching lenses seems helpful in certain cases, yet also extremely confusing in other cases (such as this one). I hope this example helps show my reservations about Strawson's classifying of how to view "normal" and "abnormal" individuals and its implications for decisions of moral responsibility.
When discussing the different types of agents and our appropriate actions toward them, Smith defines the agent with whom we take the objective attitude. As he puts it, we treat this person as “an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained…” I took this to mean that, in cases of a person who had an insufficient moral education, we must treat them with the objective attitude and find a way to educate them. This would most likely fall under some sort of restorative justice, which would attempt to normalize an abnormal moral compass.
ReplyDeleteIf, however, a person received the proper moral education, was cured of his mental disorder, or grew into maturity, he becomes an agent we can act reactively toward. For example, if your serial killer did not know before his first murder that murder was wrong, we must teach him that it is, as the individuals at the trial did. If his education was sufficient, and he now has knowledge of the correct way to act, we can now punish him if he acts badly. We can now treat him as a normal individual, and punish him as such.
Either way, we take actions if someone commits a bad act. Even if they are an agent unable to control their actions, we must endeavor to teach them or treat them for their incapacity. You seem concerned that because abnormal individuals cannot control their actions, Strawson believes we should not punish their bad actions. I would say that they would face consequences, but ones which would be appropriate for their disabilities.
I fear that you have engaged in the dichotomy of the objective vs. inter-personal reactions. Strawson recognizes that this schema that he has built neglects the complexities that lie in between both extremes. On page 88, he delves into an exploration of a "kind of compromise" between these two extremes when considering the case of parenting. Parents cannot regard their children in a wholly objective light (even though the children cannot be viewed as having the moral capabilities of adults) because if they did this all the time, they could not account for the ongoing development of moral and human attitudes within their children. Perhaps we can apply some sort of compromise to the criminal in this case. This is not to say that I know the outcome of this compromise or the legal decision that should be made, but only to suggest that one doesn't have to choose viewing the person as abnormal or normal--one can perhaps identify the criminal as somewhere in between the two.
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