An Objection from Moral Arbitrariness

In discussing Rawls’ “moral presumption against arbitrary inequalities” (127) on the bottom of page 127 and on page 128, Nagel explicitly says that Rawls does not make the following objection:

“there is something prima facie objectionable to anyone’s having lower life prospects at birth than anyone else just because of a difference between the two of them, such as the wealth of their parents or their nationality, over which neither of them had any control” (127-8).

I want to pick up where Nagel thinks that Rawls leaves off, and challenge Nagel’s political conception of justice by raising this unconditional objection to morally arbitrary factors.

Nagel admits that “We do not deserve to have been born into a particular society any more than we deserve to have been born into a particular family” (128). However, Nagel’s political conception of justice quite clearly differentiates between these two equally arbitrary considerations; according to Nagel, those born into poor families should get the benefit of their society’s system of justice, while those born into poor societies have no claim to the benefit of any kind of global justice. What Nagel must (and does) do is justify this distinction between these two different morally arbitrary factors.

He gives the following explanation: “I believe [this distinction] comes from a special involvement of agency or the will that is inseparable from membership in a political society. Not the will to become or remain a member, for most people have no choice in that regard, but the engagement of the will that is essential to life inside a society, in the dual role each member plays both as one of the society’s subjects and as one of those in whose name its authority is exercised” (128).

This is the reason for Nagel’s distinction, and this distinction seems to be at the core of Nagel’s argument. Regardless of the fact that most people have no choice about which society they are born into, the fact that they engage in their society and associate with each other both as subjects of society and participants in the general will endows them with the right to socioeconomic justice from their society.

But because it is morally arbitrary that some people end up in societies that are able and thus obligated to provide positive, distributive justice, shouldn’t the goal be to eliminate this component of luck by providing this justice to as many individuals (across as many societies) as possible? I think that irrespective of the content of positive, substantive justice guaranteed by society, we need to ensure that this justice is enjoyed by as many people in the world as possible, because what society they are born into is simply a matter of luck. And, returning to the objection from the beginning of this post, there is something unconditionally morally objectionable about arbitrary factors determining peoples’ life prospects.

Although Nagel seems to think that he has justified his political conception of justice by appealing to the unique dual engagement required by society, I am not convinced that he has defended himself from this objection because at the end of the day, who ends up able to engage in a society that secures substantive justice for its subjects is still a matter of luck.