I have always been desiring to blog
on China but never find a good opportunity. Sen, however, gives me a great
chance. Sen is definitely a person who believes in process and exercise of
freedom in addition to consequence, as he raises the distinction between “culmination
outcomes” and “comprehensive outcomes”. To him, freedom of choice is very crucial.
It is one thing to fast, but It is another to starve because the former has
alternative, but the latter does not. Freedom itself has intrinsic value as
argued in Chapter 1. Its instrumental value is what I am focusing on in this blog.
There are 5 instrumental freedoms that Sen mentions: political freedom,
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective
securities. When Sen wrote the book, China has been in a good position of
social opportunities and protective securities with the help of support-led
process. After the Openness and Reform, economic facilities have been strengthened
with growth-led process as China has become the second largest economy in the
world. Yet, political freedoms, often going along with transparency guarantees,
is in wild debate. Western politicians and academicians always criticize that China
lacks human rights, civil rights, political freedom etc. Since political
freedoms “refers to the opportunities that people have to determine who should govern
and on what principles (legislature), and also include the possibility to
scrutinize and criticize authorities (judiciary), to have freedom of political
expression and an uncensored press (media), to enjoy the freedom to choose between
different political parties (elections),” Sen’s idea is basically composed by
four fields, including elections, legislature, judiciary, and media. I am going
to examine how free China exactly is from four fields. The four arena is generally
sufficient to guarantee political freedoms. An uncensored media could also
guarantee transparency as a spectator.
The elections in China is tricky.
According to the Electoral Law of the
National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses of the People's
Republic of China, Chinese people have the right to vote and stand for election.
But above the lowest level (district/county level), the election is often
noncompetitive, even though the Electoral Law requires a 33% to 100% surplus of
candidates of the positions to be elected at the lowest level, and a 20% to 50%
at any other level, and usually the result of the elections could be predicted on
all but the lowest level.
The legislature in China, according
to the 1982 State Constitution, is the National People’s Congress, where the
power of all other institutions are vested. The State Council, which is the executive
branch of China, is a subdivision of the National People’s Congress. The
leaders of both institutions are part of the the Communist Party Politburo
Standing Committee (PSC). The political power structure between legislative and
executive branches of China is similar to that of a parliamentary system. The
executive power is entrusted by the legislature. In contrast, a parliamentary
system aims at providing a channel to balance multiple parties, whereas China
has only one major party that occupies both institutions. China lacks political
opposition and real institutional contestation, which are very important to the
political freedoms.
The power of the judiciary, mainly
vested under the Central Politics and Law Commission, the Supreme People’s
Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, is endowed by the legislature. The
judiciary, however, is de jure subordinated to the government. However, this
subordination does not necessarily mean that the judiciary would protect high
officials regardless of the consequences. Recent imprisonments of several
senior officials suggest that sometimes the state judiciary does investigate
certain high officials. But it is in fact facilitated by the Central Disciplinary
Inspection Committee, the judicial branch of the Party. Whenever a party leader
is put under examination, the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee is the
first institution to state its conviction under the Constitution of the
Communist Party of China. Following this, the remaining institutions, i.e. the
judicial branch of the government would look into the person and convict him/her
based on the Constitution of the country. Fear has been created recently among
all party and state leaders due to anti-corruption campaign, which has been the
strongest historically. He certainly did not assume more power from his
predecessor legally. Then his strong anti-corruption campaign can only be
explained by the willingness of the party, and the permission of Xi Jinping,
the party and state leader of China. However, no matter what regulations the
party government imposes, the rule of law is hard to realize. The Chinese anti-corruption
campaign is implemented based on self-examination, which may or may not exist.
On the contrary, rule of law is an institutional checking that lasts forever.
As long as the institutional structure of Chinese government does not change,
it is almost impossible to have real “rule of law.”
The media side seems to be not as
bad, since the Chinese government does not ban foreign media, despite the State
Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television censors all Chinese
publishers, news agencies, and enterprises engaging radios, films and
televisions in China. The domestic influence of New York Times, though inaccessible
in China without a VPN, is actually as strong as their international influence.
I know the blog is quite long, but I
am trying to make the point that, despite the fact that China makes a
phenomenal improvement over the past 40 years, there is a huge institutional
problem that gives rise to a lack of political freedoms, which hinders China
from becoming a fully developed country. Yet, any major institutional change
comes with a price, especially since Chinese people suffer too much in the 20th
century. To be a developed country, it requires the cooperation both within
Chinese people and with the help of outside forces.
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