I wish to preface this post by
expressing my support for Anderson's ideas about how we can use collective
identities to solve social justice issues and global problems. I found this
reading very interesting. But I would also like to present a critique.
Anderson argues for the necessity of
humans to make committed actions, actions based on “principles (reasons) that
it is rational for us (any group of
people, regarded as a collective agent) to adopt” (24), in order to solve
collective action problems. Furthermore, by assuming multiple group identities,
one can develop the individual identity needed to mediate between these
identities, and ultimately make both rational decisions and decisions that
validate one’s agency to set one’s own priorities. When one assumes this
identification with the community of humanity, “[t]his is the point at which
rationality coincides with morality” (37).
In this sense, Anderson believes an
action is moral if and only if it aligns with a group’s best interest: “If it
would be rational for a collective encompassing all of humanity to adopt a certain principle of committed action,
then action on that principle is morally
right” (25). If morality depends on the outcomes of cooperation, an act cannot
be moral in and of itself; it is wholly dependent on the situation, the undertaking of a cooperative discussion, and the merit
of its outcome.
Consider the following situation: a
jury decides that a serial killer should be sentenced to death. According to
the jurors, this decision, which came about through cooperation and discussion,
will correct the injustice that has been done to the serial killer’s many
victims and set a precedent for the punishment of other killers, in order to
deter future murders. It has been decided, through the assumption of a
collective group identity, and therefore it is morally right. (Also, suppose no
more harm would be done if the jury sentenced the murderer to a life in jail,
so the decision to not kill him would not bring positive harm to anyone.)
My intuitions, however, tell me that
murder is wrong. Why is it that the act of killing someone can be justified if a
group of people deems it so? This is tyranny of the majority—a decision does
not possess moral merit just because the vast majority agrees that the outcome
is most beneficial. This kind of morality does not seem like morality at all—it
is dependent on whether an action is rational for a group, not whether the
action is right. In this sense, it is very reminiscent of Posner and Gauthier.
I fear that although Anderson's intentions for this strategy of overcoming collective action problems are good, this kind of thinking ignores the idea that morality exists outside
of what is rational for an agent to do.
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DeleteGuys, good point! But I think you left the healthy guy out of the group. Given the healthy guy's identity of a health and functioning guy, he should not be killed in order to save the rest five people. I do not see the tyranny of the majority that much a problem if we include each person we made decision on.
DeleteAlexia,
ReplyDeleteI had similar worries while reading Anderson's paper. Beyond the concerns that you raise here, there is also the case of those within a group situation sacrificing more than others based on arbitrary factors. If everyone in the group collectively agrees that it is best to donate $10 each to the candidate's campaign that they collectively want in office, this $10 could be a simple gesture to some and a formidable sacrifice for others. This difference in effort would not seem to be taken into account based on my understanding of Anderson's argument, however, because as long as they all identified as part of the larger group, these other differences could take a back seat.
Yet, in terms of all of these concerns, I think that Anderson may still have a useful response. At the end of the paper, Anderson points out this collective action problem that groups face with one another, and suggests a response: "to solve it requires that we transcend our various parochial identities and identify with a community that comprehends them all" (37). For your worry then, the serial killer is excluded from this group in the sense that the jury would not identify with the serial killer in terms of him being a murderer. But if we adopted this comprehensive identity (i.e. humanity) then your moral intuition against killing could be justified in the sense that if humans kill other humans this is not good for the collective community, so it should not be done. Killing others could be likened to a person cutting off their own limbs.
As a last question that your post left me with, could the tyranny of the majority possibly be even more threatening if we do take on this collective identity?Anderson says herself, in order to do this we would have to commit ourselves "to placing significant constraints on appeal to preferences as reasons for action" (37). With no basis within her proposal, that I found, that justifies human rights and liberties besides through this collective identity, this could be worrisome. But, I also think that this could possibly be the easiest way to rationally justify basic rights and liberties.