At the end of our reading, Strawson laments the "overintellectualiz[ation] of the facts" by both optimistic and pessimistic determinists (91). Strawson points out that the "existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society" and such, "neither calls for, nor permits, an external 'rational' justification" (91).
This seems to summarize his critique towards existing arguments: that intellectuals can get so caught up in complicated models and theories -- attempting to balance equations of arbitrary units and utility -- that they often lose sight of our own humanity. Further, Strawson states that it "is a pity that talk of the moral sentiments has fallen out of favour" (92). Strawson sees moral sentiments as a phrase which captures "that network of human attitudes" that are capable of resolving these over-intellecutalized disputes (92). The answer, he suggests, is right in front of us, we only have to look into the core of what makes us human.
This argument resonates with me following reading Nozick, Posner, Gauthier, and others like them. It seems, these philosophers are capable of skirting their humanity by substituting morality for the cold calculus of equation balancing. When Gauthier concludes that he is haunted by the fundamental schizophrenia of his argument, perhaps some underlying moral sentiment is trying to tell him something. Viewing the world through their lens appears to leave out something intuitively important. Engaging with them feels like engaging with a color-blind person about the colors around us. They are seeing only one-dimension of a multi-dimensional issue. It reminds me of Plato's Chariot Allegory. In the Chariot Allegory, Socrates explains that the human soul can be viewed like a chariot with two horses pulling it. The charioteer represents the human intellect, one horse represents the rational/moral impulses and the other horse represents the irrational impulses (like desire). To engage with humanity requires looking at more than just the charioteer.
Adam Smith, on the other hand, cleverly uses moral sentiments to develop his hybrid approach to morality -- balancing and making an account for the duality between just and beneficent actions. Rooted in the sentiments we share as humans, Smith was capable of explaining why justice should act as a constraint on self-interest -- rebuking Gauthier's and Posner's casual acceptance of genocide and other morally monstrous events.
Exploration of moral sentiments attempts, at the very least, to dissect those reactions and attitudes humans naturally hold, and explore the intricate and complex web of interpersonal relationships that form the cornerstone of our lives.
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ReplyDeleteJacksòn,
ReplyDeleteYour post reminded me of a discussion that Eli and I had in tutorial last week. We discussed how the fatal flaw of Gauthier's argument was that in attempting to rationalize morality, he seemed to necessarily leave out all of the components of morality that seem the most important. Intuitively, we generally to want to believe that something is moral because it is good in itself, and that this should be obvious in most cases. But there are people who believe this is insufficient, and that morality requires some externally grounded rational justification. Ironically, it seems that these are the last people we should be dedicating our time to.
Perhaps they lack the fellow-feeling sympathy that Smith describes, or perhaps there is another reason behind their desire for a purely rational justification. However, as Strawson points out "we should consider also in how much of our behavior the benefit or injury resides mainly or entirely in the manifestation of the attitude itself" (76). I tend to think that if someone was convinced by solely rational arguments that morality is the right thing to do, and they behaved completely morally towards me, but for purely rational reasons, it would somehow seem off. I would not go so far as to say that it would be immoral, but I do not think I would really qualify it as moral, because morality seems to necessarily require some aspect of non-rational humanity-- some intrinsic value.
Jacksón and Kyla,
ReplyDeleteGreat post and comment, and I couldn't agree more. Throughout the reading, I was struck by specific language Strawson used to target the study of economics, particularly the use of the word "rational," of course, since the rationality assumption is the keystone of economic models. He notes that while the objective attitude towards humanity can be helpful in forming policy, it struggles to deal with scenarios in which we are compelled by our sense of morality instead of our sense of rationality, or what it is objectively reasonable for us to do in a scenario. For example, if a home catches on fire while the adults are outside and their children are inside, it might be rational to stay outside given that the chances of dying increase dramatically as soon as they enter, but they nonetheless choose to run into the house, knowing that it is the best chance of saving their children. Even if you try to make an argument using utility, it is impossible to say that you derive more utility from your child's life than your own. You can't derive utility from something if you're dead.
On a separate but related note, Kyla, I definitely agree with your point about rationally choosing morality. It would seem contrived, I think, if someone arrived at their concepts of morality as a result of rational thinking as opposed to arriving there intuitively. Rational arguments for morality, then, should find their root in our intuition and human sense of life, as opposed to an objective one. As Strawson notes, it would deny our essential humanity to arrive at them otherwise.