Sympathy vs. Empathy

Throughout Part I, Adam Smith discusses the different scenarios in which humans feel sympathy. He says that the "imaginative capacity of sympathy" allows us to feel grief or happiness when another person feels that way. Even when he goes in depth when describing the extent in which sympathy affects human nature through the lenses of different passions, Smith never once mentions the existence of empathy. I am not sure if he considers sympathy and empathy one in the same, or if he simply does not consider the existence of empathy. But I would like to challenge this model of sympathy by saying that humans are able to empathize with other people due to their own experiences, which is what allows us to imagine more realistic pictures. 

If we use his theory of imaginative capacity of sympathy, a person is able to sympathize with another because they were able to imagine the situation of the other. The distinction between empathy and sympathy is extremely important to make Smith's case stronger, in my opinion, but I would like to ask the rest of the class what they think. I believe this because there are situations that I cannot even start fathoming or imagining, such as child prostitution or child soldiers, but I still sympathize with them without empathy. However, I think that empathy is necessary in order to have a realistic imaginary picture of the situation because otherwise you are just imagining things that might be simply wrong. In 2010 there a massive 8.8 earthquake in Chile that woke me up from my sleep and is still one of the most impactful experiences of my life. This earthquake happened after the one in Haiti the same year.  I know that I was not able to understand the gravity of the situation or how vulnerable the people there must have felt. However after the Chilean earthquake, whenever I see earthquakes in the news and see the pictures, I am more reactive towards that news because I am able to feel what they feel. Ultimately, I think it is important to show that there are situations in which sympathy does not play a role and that the statement "Nothing is so soon forgot as pain" (21) might not be completely true. 

Self-Interest and Smith's Moral Theory

Smith absolutely intrigues me as his theory of moral sentiments seems to be a direct challenge to the conception of self-interest as the sole motivating factor of human behavior in a marketplace (a concept that many proponents of Smith attribute to his The Wealth of Nations). The idea of moral-decision making most definitely complicates the idea of self-interest, and selfishness in some senses, as a guide to human interaction in a commercial society as posed by Smith in The Wealth of Nations, by Posner, and by Gauthier.

Yet, I argue that Smith can reconcile his idea of self-interest with his theory of moral sentiments. One quote in particular stuck out to me is: “the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being beloved” (41). As an individual can only be beloved when others sympathize with his joys, and in turn feel happiness themselves, an individual will pursue those actions that bring him joy (and by extension bring others joy). Smith attributes it to human nature that individuals want to feel joy in order to find tranquility of mind. When phrased this way the concept of moral-decision making seems very close to the idea that individuals will act in ways that benefits their own preferences in a competitive society. An individual will seek greatness in order to feel joy, and the impartial spectator that is society sympathizes with her and also feels this joy. In this case, the individual pursuing joy is benefiting herself while also benefiting others in their pursuit for tranquility of the mind. Not only does this interpretation of Smith’s theory reinforce the pursuit of self-interest, it also expands the concept of self-interest, encompassing those actions that would be deemed as “moral” by the impartial spectator (i.e. which the impartial spectator would approve of by expressing sympathy towards that individual). In this sense, it is in the self-interest of individuals to act morally, infusing economic thought with ethics, a position that Sen would definitely advocate.

Furthermore, I appreciate Smith’s theory of moral sentiments as it does not closely resemble other moral philosophical thought. At first, while reading, I thought the book should be described as psychology rather than moral philosophy. However, I have now come to consider Smith’s normative theory as integral to describing human behavior as it is, why it is that way, and what it should be in certain circumstances. How else to justify why we make moral judgments the way we do besides looking at exactly our thought processes in regards to interactions with other humans? Smith grounds his theory in reality, explaining the circumstances in which we express sympathy, and those in which we do not, as well as the circumstances when we can express all the emotion we want, and other instances when we should definitely dial it down if we want anyone to ever talk to us again. I see Smith’s theory as a direct appeal not to moral intuitions, but to emotional intuitions that guide our everyday interactions with others.

yet another post on intrinsic value

            While Posner finds many concepts such as rights, the law, etc. conveniently affirmed by his appeal to the wealth-maximization principle, I find his justification of the wealth-maximization principle in relation to corrective justice very flawed. In an attempt to justify how wealth-maximization would account for corrective justice, he appeals to the Aristotelian concept of corrective justice. Since the Aristotelian concept of corrective justice is procedural (reification for wrongful acts is determined without appealing to the “relative merit of injurer and victim considered apart from the act”(74)) and because the definition of ‘wrongful’ is not explicitly stated, Posner believes that his theory is consistent with Aristotle’s. According to his theory, “an act of injustice [is] an act that reduces the wealth of society” (74). An unjust act is only instrumentally “unjust” in that it does not lead to an efficient outcome.

Consider the following example:

Joey is a homeless man. Joey sits outside Bob’s café and oftentimes scares away customers by virtue of his haggard appearance. Bob becomes enraged by all of the potential customers that he loses. Finally, he decides to take action by hacking Joey into pieces.

            According to wealth maximization theory, Bob was warranted in killing Joey. Killing Joey did not result in any loss of value to society—the murder actually resulted in an increase in value because Joey prevented Bob from doing business and generally being productive. This case of ‘corrective justice’ fails to punish Bob for killing another human being—a morally egregious act. Our intuitions tell us that a human being’s life is intrinsically worth something or at least that Bob should be punished for what he has done. According to Posner, however, a human being’s life is worth as much as he or she contributes to society.

            If Posner finds this situation to be as morally abhorrent as I do, he may have to admit to some substantive definition of what is morally wrong instead of deeming wrongfulness equivalent to inefficiency. There is absolutely no place for ethics in his theory—it is pure economics.

Are Market Interactions Always Mutually Advantageous?

            On page 83, and at many other points throughout the piece, Posner argues for the validity and evidential mutual advantage that is to be had by free market interactions: “Lawfully obtained wealth is created by doing things for other people – offering them advantageous trades.” Let’s think about this relative to sweatshops for a second. Imagine we have a company, and let’s call it Ekin or Sadida. Ekin makes sports apparel, and they have enduring brand appeal around the world. Their clothes and shoes sell for many times what it costs to produce them. Part of this low cost is the fact that they pay the factory workers (in places where labor unions are illegal or limited) between $1 and $10 per day. At the same time, the upper management at Ekin make many millions of dollars – the former CEO, call him Nil Phight, has an estimated net worth of about $27 billion. Ekin contracts with the factories to get its apparel and shoes at low prices, and the factories agree to this. At the wage they pay their laborers, they still take a solid cut. Their laborers work in the factories because that is the market available to them, even though these jobs provide for the most intensely minimal standard of living possible. They work long hours to try to provide for their families, and as a result, don’t get to see them very often. They work in terrible conditions and live shortened, unhealthy lives. This could hardly be called ad advantageous situation for them, yet they take part because they have no choice.

            This is a long way of asking the question: can Posner really make the assumption that all trades in the market are mutually advantageous, simply because they were consented to? With no market power and without the means of making enough money to progress upwards socioeconomically, is there even a choice here? Does wealth maximization really just dramatically favor the well-off, those who have won the genetic lottery? I would tend to think so, and I find it disturbing that a well-regarded appellate judge relies on this theory.

Wealth, Consent, and Lifeboats

1) Multiple times throughout Posner's piece, Posner asserts an assumption about wealth and productivity: "the buyers $10,000 was in all likelihood accumulated through productive activity -- that is, activity beneficial to other people besides himself, whether to his employer, customers, or his father's customers"(66). I find Posner's stipulation that, essentially, people with wealth -- no matter how they acquired it -- are never parasites, rather, by definition, give more to society than they are taking. This just doesn't hold water.

For example, I could sell drugs (like heroin) to consenting adults who become addicted. Building an empire on my addicted customers I can rake in millions of dollars. Further, let's say their children become addicted, I make millions more. Even further, my son inherits the millions I built selling heroin to addicted customers. Does the fact that my son is holding money really indicate that he has given more to society than he has taken? Or, especially in this case, has he (or I) simply found a way to exploit consenting adults into giving him more? Did I really acquire my wealth by "doing things for other people" and "offering them advantageous trades?" (83) If you disagree because heroin isn't 'lawful' (as Posner stipulates these trades must be and I think in his world would be), replace heroin with cigarettes around the world and the effects are almost magnified.


2 ) Secondly, Posner makes another alarming claim:

"Suppose A, perhaps to provide money for his family (but the reason is unimportant), sells himself into slavery to B; or C borrows money from D with a penalty clause that in the event of default D can break C's knees. From a wealth-maximizing standpoint there is no economic basis for refusing to enforce either contract unless some element of fraud or duress is present" (86).

While Posner makes his tagline "unless some element of fraud or duress is present," he overlooks a key concept in economics: the lifeboat. The lifeboat situation is an example of market failure. Suppose you are in a lifeboat miles away from land and days before rescue. How much are you willing to pay for the only water on board? Truly, an unlimited or incalculable price (I think Kyla's post on "willingness to pay vs ability to pay" as value parallels this). Why? Because otherwise you will die. Interestingly, I think this simple scenario is not actually a market failure, rather, it illuminates an answer to a central point of contention: human life does have some sort of absolute intrinsic value; if it didn't, there would be a maximum price I would be willing to pay for water on the lifeboat. Just because I have $0, does not mean I value my life at $0. This is ludicrous.  So long as I am not in a lifeboat situation (I would argue the necessity to feed my family is one), markets may provide a good way of allocating resources to achieve human ends. That being said, so long as human ends are in conflict with the market mechanism itself, it appears, human ends ought to trump that mechanism.

Of Mice and Morality

One of the things I find most interesting about Posner is his attempts to rationalize his principles. You mention that you feel uncomfortable with Posner’s dismissal of the intrinsic value of humans, and from his writing, it appears that he is as well. He spends a significant portion of his writing attempting to explain how welfare maximization fit with our moral intuitions and is not conducive to moral monstrousness. Even though Posner argues for a form of morality and justice based on welfare maximization, he bends over backwards to make it seem more palatable. Posner attempts to justify welfare maximization by showing that economic liberty will be upheld in his scheme, and that he gives weight to both utility and consent. Economic liberty will be ensured because all economists believe in the wealth maximization of free markets, it’s obviously the best solution. This sort of protection of liberty, however, is superficial at best and nonexistent at worst. If there were some sort of market failure, the most efficient solution for which would be to suspend liberty, no doubt it would be suspended indefinitely. He also explains how segregation, genocide, and slavery would be “far-fetched” and that it would be “unlikely” that it would increase society’s wealth. Posner also claims that welfare maximization would involve “greater respect for individual choice”, and that it has a firmer foundation for a theory of justice. He mentions that it provides a basis for laws, and that they must, among other things, treat people equally. However, he also does not believe that a person without the means to support himself should have a say in the distribution of resources. This is because, as Posner puts it, “to treat the inventor and the idiot equally concerning their moral claim… does not take seriously the differences between persons.” It seems that this completely undermines Posner’s claim that he allows for individual choice and for consistency with intuitive morality.

Posner’s justification for welfare maximization based on being consistent with pareto efficiency and consent is nonsensical. He attempts to use this a basis for his welfare maximization while also claiming that morality is based whether morals maximize welfare. Posner plays a game of circular logic, begging the question of basic rights when he tries to maximize welfare and vice versa. There is no independent justification for his welfare maximization, and he rests on no more solid ground than the utilitarian he decries. He uses many examples of how our current system is based on economics, but fails to provide independent reasoning as to why it should.

The Importance of who we are exactly Dealing with when Evaluating Utilitarianism

It is important to highlight Posner's discussion and speculation on the domain in utilitarianism. Posner proposes the two following questions:

1) "Whose happiness is to count into designing policies to maximize the greatest happiness?"

2) "Does the happiness of animals count?"

We must take note of who we are exactly talking about and dealing with when analyzing and interpreting utilitarianism. Are we determining utility based on the happiness of humans under the age of 21? Are there other factors in addition to the human population and animals determining levels of happiness today? These are difficult questions to answer.
Nevertheless, I specifically found Posner's use of an excerpt by J.J.C. Smart very interesting. Smart finds it "hard to agree" to the idea that "a contented sheep is as good as a contented philosopher" (52). Yet, he is unable to find evidence in utilitarian theory that separates a happy sheep from a happy philosopher. This allows Posner to conclude, "Since utility in its broad sense is something possessed by many animals, the theory seems to require including sheep and pigs in the population whose happiness is to be maximized"(53). I have personally never thought of utility in economics in such an overly inclusive way. How do animals specifically influence a society's overall happiness in an economic sense? The point Posner attempts to get across is that we must use the "broadest possible conception of the relevant population" (53). While I do agree with Posner that it is important to have a wide-ranging domain, I believe there is a certain extent to how broad the domain should be.