In Section 29, Rawls has a lot to say about why his two principles of justice - but mainly the difference principle - would be far superior to the principle of average utility as the governing principles of the basic structure of society. He mentions the "burden of commitment", pointing out that the principle of average utility could demand that "some, particularly the less favored, should forgo advantages for the sake of the greater good of the whole" (155), which would not be easy for those unlucky individuals. In contrast, Rawls points out, in a society governed by the difference principle, "Not only do the parties protect their basic rights but they insure themselves against the worst eventualities" (154), substantially decreasing the potential burden of commitment in those worst cases where it matters. Rawls goes on to insist that the difference principle will promote a more "stable" conception of societal justice than the principle of average utility because the difference principle caters to self-interest whereas the principle of average utility demands "a greater identification with the interests of others" (154).
I'm not blogging about whether or not Rawls has or has not defeated pure utilitarianism with these and similar arguments. What I want to point out is: I do not think that these arguments for the difference principle are at all effective when the difference principle is compared to one of the "Mixed Conceptions" that Rawls includes on his list of alternative principles. In a society with fair equality of opportunity that maintains a respectable social minimum, and then allows the principle of average utility to govern the rest of the wealth/income distribution (something like B3 from the list on page 107), the burden of commitment would be negligent even to those at the bottom of the heap. Such a society would certainly be stable in the sense that self-interested people would not have to worry about being left behind. In fact, a self-interested person (behind the veil of ignorance or not) might think something like:
"Hmmm... this mixed conception society promises me the minimum that I need, and in the event that I rise above this minimum, I am likely to be wealthier in this mixed conception society than in a society where we give as much as possible to those who have the least."
My question is: how would/does/could Rawls argue that the difference principle is superior to the mixed conception as the basic distributive principle of society?
Really interesting, carefully targeted challenge. Would your alternative include fair equality of opportunity as well? If so, it would include the first principle, the first part of the second principle, and, in place of the second part, a guaranteed decent minimum and the remaining distribution governed by average utility. How significant, I wonder, are the differences between such a proposal and Rawls's own? Are the differences susceptible to any of the challenges that he raises against average utility generally? Interesting questions; interesting post.
ReplyDelete