Wednesday, February 17, 2016

Ripstein’s government – a Critique of Nozick

            Even though Ripstein never mentions Nozick in his paper, nonetheless it is a good response to Nozick’s almost no-need-to-exist government because Nozick believes that, as long as the people do not violate his principles, there is not much role for government to play. Ripstein, on the contrary to Nozick, believes that state power (police power) is very crucial to create a system of equal freedom, which will enhance people’s public rights. The public rights are the precondition to extend one’s innate individual right to one’s property right. The government will provide people equal public rights through mandatory cooperation, which is more enforcing than private contract because others cannot compel one to do anything, while the government can. Under Ripstein’s government, the problem of entitlement is solved by public provision. Public terms of access to roads guarantees that there will be no privatization. The entitlement to get from place to place is given by the government. The central difference here between mandatory cooperation and private compelling is that, the state, acting on behalf of the citizens as a collective body, has legitimate powers that neither individual citizens nor any group of them have apart from it, even groups containing millions of people. To further illustrate the strength and usefulness of government regulation as opposed to private compelling, Prof Hurley raises the example of contract vs promise. In private, one can make any promise and breaks it without any punishment. In front of a government, a promise becomes a contract and is legally enforced. Punishment is unavoidable if the contract is broken.  

Ripstein’s government is a powerful government. But it is not omnipotent. It actually sets an upper bound to what government can do. Anything the government does must be pertinent to secure the individual private freedom. A national freeway system is rightful of government behavior according to Ripstein, but airline services are not. A universal basic education act is necessary, but an act to promote college education is not. A public speech can be exempt from the police power, but a street performance cannot. Within the boundary, the police power overrides individual rights. Beyond the boundary, it is not the government’s responsibility to act. As Ripstein said, the Kantian account of the public use of power is only legitimate in the service of individual freedom.

1 comment:

  1. Hey Sebastian! Nice comment. I've just got a couple of extension questions!

    In your last paragraph you imply a college education is not pertinent to secure individual private freedom. If we held that personal freedom can not be fully or truly realized (as you imply it can't without universal basic education), would the state be entitled to provide it?

    In another way, under a Kantian framework, is it possible that background circumstances change such that personal freedom requires more education?

    If it is, is the threshold determined by our political institutions as Ripstein seems to leave many questions or does minimum education have a maximum government duty?

    Just throwing in my two cents!

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