Deprivation: The Umbrella for the Issue of Inferiority and Lack of Individualism (Allow this to sink in for a minute)

The concept of deprivation is key throughout Anderson’s commentary on Sen’s argument regarding preference. Deprivation is deeply intertwined with the status and perception of women in many societies, in addition to serving as a factor to achieving individuality. Anderson writes, “Seriously disadvantaged people often adapt their self-interested preferences to their limited opportunities: they lower their aspirations to avoid frustration. 'The extent of a person's deprivation . . . may not at all show up in the metric of desire-fulfillment, even though he or she may be quite unable to be adequately nourished, decently clothed, minimally educated, and properly sheltered' (Sen, 1992, p. 55)” (Anderson 23). To a certain extent Anderson implies that societal disadvantage affects the true preferences of an individual. In fact, this issue specifically applies to and affects women in many societies, some more than others. Women often become blinded of their actual preferences by their societal ranks and presumed responsibilities. From a young age, women grow up with the impression of taking care of the children, depending on their husbands and being only in charge of household duties; this allows for the problem of systematic disadvantage of women to arise on a universal level.

The greatest issue is that women have become inferior to men. As Anderson writes, “… the cost of exiting marriage is higher for women than for men, and men therefore enjoy a threat advantage that they can exploit within marriage” (Anderson 34). Considering the fact that women often do not pursue an education and therefore lack in obtaining a substantial job, they are at an immediate disadvantage, which gives way for exploitation, especially in marriage. The problem of exploitation also affects the preference of women. To support this claim note Anderson’s following interpretation on one of Sen’s claims: “Their wide preferences include the interests of other people, often to such a high degree that they have difficulty conceiving of their own interests as distinct from those of their family members. When Indian women are asked about their own welfare, they typically answer in terms of how well their family is doing (Sen, 1990, pp. 125-6) (Anderson 34). The example of Indian women, demonstrates how women have become subconscious of their true preferences because of social status and the exploitation men have proposed of them. Overall, the issue of exploitation and inferiority among women mostly affects Individuality within a society. Women are often forced to identify themselves as mothers or housewives, thus creating a barrier to their true individualism; there become unknown of their true personal desires. Nevertheless, I wonder if and how a woman could break free from inferiority? Would such be possible in a society like India’s or China’s, where men are most dominant? Are such women even familiar with the idea and possibility of Individuality?

Women, Ethnic Minorities, and Social Norms

Elizabeth Anderson's reasoning behind why marriage provokes systematic disadvantage for women is extremely interesting. She explains that women accept a lesser share of resources for four main reasons:

1. They have little bargaining power.
2. They think that they ought not to act like a hard bargainer.
3. They have a hard time seeing themselves in this role in any event, given the difficulty they have conceiving of their interests as distinct from their family's interests.
4. They think that they deserve, and hence ought to accept, only the little they are getting.

Anderson revisits her emphasis on identity as a tool for decision-making in an effort to provide solutions that would alleviate these constraints. She suggests that entry into the workforce could serve as a strong platform to adopt new identities. In adopting roles that extend beyond their expectations of mothers, women are able to develop a new sense of individuality that transforms the understanding of their role in society as a collective.

While reading over the constraints on women, I could not help but wonder if similar constraints exist among other marginalized groups whose roles are less socially defined. Before delving into this question, it is important to draw a distinction between inherited identities and acquired identities. I think Anderson makes a strong point because she comes to describe how underprivileged groups can change the perception of their inherited identities by acquiring other socially-desirable identities, which effectively alter the perception of their inherited identities.

In questioning how Anderson's theory could be applied to other underprivileged groups, I began to consider the constraints on ethnic minorities. The constraints on individuals of color are unique in that they are not as socially defined as the roles expected of women. This suggests a problem that is more closely related to psychology rather than sociology. Essentially, ethnic minorities place a set of limitations that inhibit their full potential due to a lack of representation in roles that imply social advantage. For example, in considerations regarding academic performance that could potentially lead to college admission, ethnic minorities are more likely to make negative decisions on the basis of conforming to decisions made by members of their social group. By presenting the decision-making process of other identities, we can provide further evidence on the dangers of asking 'What should we do?', instead of 'What should I do?'.

Who Ate My Chocolate Chip Cookie?

I found the reading to be both extremely fascinating and equally confusing. I'll try to do my best to flesh out the argument to provide an explanation for my confusion in trying to picture why it is humanly impossible for society to fully accept (or at least modify interactions as a result of) determinism.

So, starting from the beginning, it is clear that there are two attitudes: the objective attitude and the reactive attitude. It is important to learn how each provides uniquely distinct methods for gauging appropriate reactions to conflict. The reactive attitude is essentially that which we would adopt under "normal" circumstances. That is, when the aggressor has the moral autonomy to decide what would constitute rational action. Alternatively, the objective attitude is adopted under circumstances where the aggressor has some characteristic(s) that inhibit their ability to act rationally. 

For example, I would be angry if Isabella ate my chocolate chip cookie. Isabella, being the morally capable and rational individual that she is, understood the consequences of her action and, as such, I would make the reactive decision to not talk to her for an entire week. If my three-year-old cousin were to commit the same crime, however, my response would be different and I would forgive him after only five minutes. Notice that the emphasis in both scenarios is very different. In the first, I seem to solely focus on Isabella and her decision to betray me after trusting her alone with my chocolate chip cookie. In the second scenario, however, I place more emphasis on the action rather than the agent. This essentially serves as the gauge for how we come to preference a certain attitude in any given scenario of conflict, with the former constituting reactive attitude and the latter being more closely related to objective attitude.

Although Strawson comes to eventually strike down the idea that we should try to uncover whether or not determinism plays a role in our society, I can't help but wonder what accepting determinism would do to the relationship between objective and reactive attitudes. This may be a bit tangential, but I started to question whether our preconceived ideas behind the definitions of the two would be flipped. For example, I can predict that a child will act irrationally to a certain degree. Thus, a child could be expected to provoke an objective attitude on my behalf, ensuring that I can never really hold the child fully accountable for his/her actions. Now take a step back and apply this expectation to everyone. If determinism were accepted, we would live in a society where our interactions with one another are held to an objective attitude where we would not be able to hold any individual accountable for their actions. Would it no longer be acceptable/normal to adopt a reactive attitude toward agents when matters of conflict arise? Do we always fall back on the excuses of psychological health, age, God's plan, etc.?

Christianity and Strawson

Whenever I read about the ideas of determinism and free will, the first idea that comes to my mind is the idea that free will exists within God's determined plan in Presbyterian Church. When I was in the Youth Group and we first discussed why there is suffering in the world, my small group teacher told us that it is due to the existence of free will. Even though God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, humans have free will in Presbyterian belief because there is a notion that we decide to sin/ask for forgiveness at our own volition. However, the master plan is already crafted by God.

When I was reading Strawson's piece though, I kept on wondering what he would think about the relationship between God and humans. In his argument, Strawson delineates a difference between reactive and objective attitudes. The former refers to the interpersonal relationships in which the intentions in interactions matter while the latter refers to a rather objective standpoint between two people that are not able to interact normally. If we try to use Strawson's divisions, the relationship between God and humans should take a reactive attitude because our intentions matter when we are being judged on judgement day. At the same time though, humans are flawed, so should we all be treated "objectively"? Should we all be free from moral responsibility? Our relationship with God is very different than a relationship from man to man because God is a superior being and humans are not able to understand God's "ultimate plan". Hence, it is not determinism that makes us morally free but the very fact that our relationship with God (if one is a believer) should take an objective attitude. So, I just wanted to ask what people thought about where this relationship would stand in terms of Strawson's idea because I thought it would be interesting to explore.

Furthermore, I think that the Presbyterian belief that free will and determinism are compatible is true because God has knowledge that no other person in this world can understand, and therefore he is able to determine the end. However, within our existence, we are able to make decisions for our own that affect each other's thoughts and existences but do not necessarily affect the grand scheme of things. Like Strawson, I do not think that whether or not the world is truly determined really matters to the idea that we do exercise free will because we have extremely short lives relative to the infinity of time.

The Moral Community and Moral Responsibility

I really enjoyed the Strawson article (once I managed to get a handle on what he was saying which was not an easy feat), and the way that Strawson flips the determinist question on its head. Instead of attempting to answer the question "is determinism true?" he instead poses "does determinism fit in with our established conceptions of how we view one another?". By appealing to our moral intuitions (like Smith), he builds a theory of interpersonal relationships, detailing that because humans are incapable of conceiving of life after proving determinism true, determinism cannot be true. Strawson bases his theory on an account of actual human perceptions and conduct instead of theorizing how we ought to act based on some vague concept claiming our actions and decisions are not products of our own capabilities and reasoning.

In his article, Strawson argues that there are certain groups of people that are "outside" the "moral community" as we understand it (86). These individuals are exceptions to the standard situation in which we take the reactive stance and judge interactions based on our own beliefs and perceptions about ourselves and the other individual. Whereas we demand goodwill from "normal" individuals, certain individuals we believe cannot be the "object of that kind of demand for goodwill or regard which is reflected in our ordinary reactive attitudes" (78). These certain individuals are those who lack typical emotional capacities (i.e. psychotic), those who are children, those in abnormal circumstances due to stress or those who had negative formative experiences. These "abnormal" individuals are thus outside of the moral community as the "normal" individuals understand it and should be treated differently and viewed objectively in their actions."Normal" individuals see "abnormal" individuals as "an object of social policy...of something to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided" (79).

Strawson thus establishes that certain individuals can be outside of the moral community and these individuals should be viewed with the understanding that their actions are not their own, that instead they are a product of abnormality or bad formative experiences. Where does that leave us when dealing with those who know what they are doing is wrong but consistently do so anyway (like serial killers for example)? I don't see how we can call these permanently apathetic individuals totally outside the expectations of the "normal" moral community. Let's say there is a serial killer who got off once because of a mistrial and during the trial many individuals claimed what a horrendous act it was to kill innocent people. In his trial, he claimed that he had a bad childhood and was never taught the proper differences between right and wrong. This acquitted serial killer then goes back into the world and starts killing more people again, despite the fact others told him it was wrong. How should we view him? We could take the objective view and blame his immoral actions to his bad upbringing. Yet, he was brought back into the "moral community" and told his actions were wrong, correcting his undeveloped moral compass. So then should we view him reactively, as a "normal" individual and punish him consequently? Basically, should we hold this individual morally responsible?

This flip-flop ability of switching lenses seems helpful in certain cases, yet also extremely confusing in other cases (such as this one). I hope this example helps show my reservations about Strawson's classifying of how to view "normal" and "abnormal" individuals and its implications for decisions of moral responsibility.

The Application of Strawson’s idea on education

Before I make my point, I would hope to have a discussion of what the main points of Strawson at the beginning of tomorrow’s class. The paper is a little confusing to me. I am not entirely sure if I understand correctly.

When reading Smith, I was thinking that everyone should be responsible to their behaviors. I think that education would be a good method to teach people who are not capable of sympathizing or retrospection on past behaviors. I believe that most people innately have this capability, but they need training and education to make sure how to use the capability. I do not realize why education would be useful even though I have this intuition. Strawson, in his paper, actually answers my question by raising the idea of objective attitude and participant attitude in dealing with people’s mistake. Strawson argues that, for a capable adult, it is ok for spectators or victims to use participant attitude, but for a child or mentally ill person, they should use objective attitude. And “[their] objectivity of attitude, [their] suspension of ordinary moral reactive attitudes, is profoundly modified by the fact that the aim of the enterprise is to make such suspension unnecessary or less necessary” (88). I believe that this is actually the meaning of education. More capable of people teach less capable people through patience so that less capable become more capable. This is true to most of the classrooms around the world.

One thing that confuses me is that I am not sure what the incentive for the most capable people to teach the young people because it takes a great effort and capability for people to know when to use objective attitude and participant attitude. For the most capable ones, they might have to to suffer the most, endure the most, be the most objective one. It is definitely not something that adds up their satisfaction. The only reason to answer my confusion that I can think of now is that even though it takes energy for the most capable ones to teach the less capable ones for some time, but in the long run, the more capable ones would have a more mature society than the one the more capable people would have if they do not tolerate and teach the less capable people.

A return to moral sentiments

At the end of our reading, Strawson laments the "overintellectualiz[ation] of the facts" by both optimistic and pessimistic determinists (91). Strawson points out that the "existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something we are given with the fact of human society" and such, "neither calls for, nor permits, an external 'rational' justification" (91).

This seems to summarize his critique towards existing arguments: that intellectuals can get so caught up in complicated models and theories -- attempting to balance equations of arbitrary units and utility -- that they often lose sight of our own humanity. Further, Strawson states that it "is a pity that talk of the moral sentiments has fallen out of favour" (92). Strawson sees moral sentiments as a phrase which captures "that network of human attitudes" that are capable of resolving these over-intellecutalized disputes (92). The answer, he suggests, is right in front of us, we only have to look into the core of what makes us human.

This argument resonates with me following reading Nozick, Posner, Gauthier, and others like them. It seems, these philosophers are capable of skirting their humanity by substituting morality for the cold calculus of equation balancing. When Gauthier concludes that he is haunted by the fundamental schizophrenia of his argument, perhaps some underlying moral sentiment is trying to tell him something. Viewing the world through their lens appears to leave out something intuitively important. Engaging with them feels like engaging with a color-blind person about the colors around us. They are seeing only one-dimension of a multi-dimensional issue. It reminds me of Plato's Chariot Allegory. In the Chariot Allegory, Socrates explains that the human soul can be viewed like a chariot with two horses pulling it. The charioteer represents the human intellect, one horse represents the rational/moral impulses and the other horse represents the irrational impulses (like desire). To engage with humanity requires looking at more than just the charioteer.

Adam Smith, on the other hand, cleverly uses moral sentiments to develop his hybrid approach to morality -- balancing and making an account for the duality between just and beneficent actions. Rooted in the sentiments we share as humans, Smith was capable of explaining why justice should act as a constraint on self-interest -- rebuking Gauthier's and Posner's casual acceptance of genocide and other morally monstrous events.

Exploration of moral sentiments attempts, at the very least, to dissect those reactions and attitudes humans naturally hold, and explore the intricate and complex web of interpersonal relationships that form the cornerstone of our lives.