As I read over the details of the two-level model, I began to give consideration to the severity of violations that would have to occur to justify intervention. This is where the distinction between pro tanto reasons and conclusory reasons must be drawn. Conclusory reasons compel us to ignore other considerations and require intervention. Beitz uses genocide and torture as examples that would give us conclusory reasons to act. Pro tanto reasons, on the other hand, "are genuine reasons for action, but they do not necessarily override competing reasons that may also be in play" (117). The existence of pro tanto reasons calls for international responses of varying strength.
International response to the Libyan crisis serves as a real-world example of how disagreement over the characterization of pro tanto and conclusory reasons can cause serious conflict. The U.N.'s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) commitment is the closest application of Beitz's two-level model. R2P essentially requires sovereign states to protect its own citizens from human rights violations and gives the U.N. the permission to employ the use of force as a last resort to uphold this requirement. Under the influence of R2P, the U.N. adopted Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect civilians during the Libyan Civil War under "all necessary means possible." The resolution included demands such as a ceasefire, but it soon became apparent the the requirements outlined would not be implemented by Gaddafi's government. As a result, western powers began to provide direct aid to anti-Gaddafi forces.
Various countries that had abstained from the original mandate accused the alliance of overstepping its authority in an attempt to overthrow the regime and served as a direct and illegal violation of Libya's sovereignty. Following this argument, while there may have existed pro tanto reasons to provide humanitarian aid, these reasons were not strong enough to constitute coercion. The western powers, on the other hand, used the language of "all necessary means possible" to inject conclusory reasons as a justification for the use of force. The tension over this disagreement has caused many states to become much more skeptical of R2P due to the perceived possibility of its exploitation.
Brian,
ReplyDeleteYou definitely raise an interesting point regarding to what extent the international community can intervene in failures of human rights. Beitz evades directly answering this question by claiming that "what forms of action by which agents would be permissible for various types of violations" should be decided upon in the "public discourse of human rights" (125). This answer seems to me incomplete, leaving too much room for interpretation as you exemplify in the case of Libya. To Beitz, only putting human rights into practice, and solidifying it through doctrine, provides any ideas as to what role the international community should play. The reason why I believe his answer seems incomplete is that it potentially gives the international community too much power to enforce its own agenda, effectively eliminating the western powers' commitment to self-determination. It seems that as long as a state has pro tanto reasons to intervene, its intervention is authorized, and it is free to play whatever role it deems best in securing another states' human rights. What are the limits to the role that the international community can play in the affairs of another state? To me, Beitz provides an unsatisfactory answer to this question of what constitutes obligation to act in certain scenarios.
Furthermore, I do not believe that Beitz provides a very comprehensive theory of human rights. If anything, Beitz just provides an interesting way to look at human rights in the way that they are practiced and discussed in the international community.