In chapter four, Beitz discusses agreement theory and its role in intercultural agreements when it comes to human rights. According to the agreement theory "governments may not always conform to the political values of their own cultures, so there is likely to be room for criticism even if human rights are limited to those to which all cultures can agree" (78). As Beitz states, there is a problem with this type of mentality because it only legitimates human rights within the countries that accept them. Therefore, the context in which a person is determines whether or not their fundamental rights are allowed to be practiced.
I am not completely sure if I am interpreting the text correctly, but the agreement theory seems to suggest that humans do not have intrinsic value until there is an agreement. The intrinsic value of human beings does not truly exist until society decides to give humans intrinsic value. I think this is counterintuitive because human existence comes before the existence of a society, so the fundamental value of being human transcends the value that is given by society. Beitz seems to be saying that different countries have to cooperate and decide that a right exists together, but I think that countries agreeing only increases the freedoms of the individuals in each country. There is a set of fundamental rights that come with being human. These might be things that are more in line with natural rights and intrinsic value, but there are things that are simply wrong and no one deserves--suffering, starvation, genocide. While it can be argued that the development of these actions caused a reaction for humans to consider to protect those rights, I think that the right was already there but we just did not know what exactly it was until a situation was able to truly uncover and challenged that right.
Cristina,
ReplyDeleteI definitely agree with your beliefs that “There is a set of fundamental rights that come with being human” and that “there are things that are simply wrong and no one deserves—suffering, starvation, genocide”. And, I think that Beitz agrees with you, too.
Beitz invokes something you mention – that genocide is unconditionally wrong – to highlight the fundamental problem with the agreement conception. He asks us to consider a hypothetical racist society that chooses to sterilize an entire racial minority. “If we accepted an agreement conception”, Beitz writes, “we would have to delete the right against genocide from the catalog of genuine human rights because it would be neither part of nor consistent with the racist conception” (78). However, as you point out, accepting genocide for this (or any) reason goes against our intuition that genocide is always wrong. The agreement theory “threatens to deprive human rights of their critical edge” (78), concludes Beitz. Whereas human rights should be able to protect individuals from immoral societies, the agreement theory forces human rights to conform to such societies.
However, I am skeptical of your claim that the agreement theory suggests that humans do not necessarily have intrinsic value. An important part of any global human rights theory dealing with today’s state-centric world is the mechanism that it suggests for interference by one country into another. Beitz points out that one of the appealing things about the agreement theory is that “Confining human rights to the contents of a possible intercultural agreement seems to offer the best defense against the objection that interference to defend human rights is unacceptably paternalistic” (84). The agreement theory will never allow one society to impose its ideas about human rights onto another. It will never value one group’s human rights ideals over another. To me, there seems to be a respect for intrinsic value present in this aspect of the agreement theory. At least in potential cases of justified interference, it seems like the agreement theory actually prioritizes and protects the intrinsic value of human beings.
Perhaps a modified version of the agreement theory of human rights that unconditionally guarantees some basic set of rights, and then allows for expansions and additions to the set of legitimiate human rights in cases of intercultural agreement would be most respectful of humans’ intrinsic value.
Cristina,
ReplyDeleteSimilar to Eli, I also question your interpretation of “humans not [having] intrinsic value until there is an agreement.” I believe Beitz is well aware that humans have intrinsic value. In fact, I believe Beitz thinks we have intrinsic value under all circumstances, not just under the presence of an agreement. Morality plays a significant role in the lives of humans. Moral standards establish the intrinsic value of humans, such as in the example you use of how we do not deserve to suffer, starve or face genocide.
In terms of the agreement theory, I would like to first elaborate more on your last statement of how “the right was already there but we just did not know what exactly it was until a situation was able to truly uncover and challenged that right.” Intrinsic value immediately implies specific rights upon humans. These right may include, not being allowed to steal from others, not committing murder and respecting authorities. Beitz may agree that we are again knowledgeable to these rights or boundaries per se. I believe the difficultly with human rights and intrinsic value is rather choosing to abide by and consider such. There is no need to encounter a situation where we must uncover any right. The matter is simply about accepting the right and then coming to an agreement of whether or not to obtain a high regard to it.